Continuum time limit and stationary states of the Minority Game

We discuss in detail the derivation of stochastic differential equations for the continuum time limit of the Minority Game. We show that all properties of the Minority Game can be understood by a careful theoretical analysis of such equations. In particular, i) we confirm that the stationary state properties are given by the ground state configurations of a disordered (soft) spin system; ii) we derive the full stationary state distribution; iii) we characterize the dependence on initial conditions in the symmetric phase and iv) we clarify the behavior of the system as a function of the learning rate. This leaves us with a complete and coherent picture of the collective behavior of the Minority Game. Strikingly we find that the temperature like parameter which is introduced in the choice behavior of individual agents turns out to play the role, at the collective level, of the inverse of a thermodynamic temperature.Comment: Revised version (several new results added). 12 pages, 5 figure

Reply to Comment on ``Thermal Model for Adaptive Competition in a Market''

We reply to the Comment of Challet et al. [cond-mat/0004308] on our paper [Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 4429 (1999)]. We show that the claim of the Comment that the effects of the temperature in the Thermal Minority Game ``can be eliminated by time rescaling'' and consequently the behaviour is ``independent of T'' has no general validity.Comment: 1 page, 1 figur

Generalized strategies in the Minority Game

We show analytically how the fluctuations (i.e. standard deviation) in the Minority Game (MG) can be made to decrease below the random coin-toss limit if the agents use more general behavioral strategies. This suppression of the standard deviation results from a cancellation between the actions of a crowd, in which agents act collectively and make the same decision, and an anticrowd in which agents act collectively by making the opposite decision to the crowd.Comment: Revised manuscript: a few minor typos corrected. Results unaffecte

Criticality and finite size effects in a simple realistic model of stock market

We discuss a simple model based on the Minority Game which reproduces the main stylized facts of anomalous fluctuations in finance. We present the analytic solution of the model in the thermodynamic limit and show that stylized facts arise only close to a line of critical points with non-trivial properties. By a simple argument, we show that, in Minority Games, the emergence of critical fluctuations close to the phase transition is governed by the interplay between the signal to noise ratio and the system size. These results provide a clear and consistent picture of financial markets as critical systems.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

Trading behavior and excess volatility in toy markets

We study the relation between the trading behavior of agents and volatility in toy markets of adaptive inductively rational agents. We show that excess volatility, in such simplified markets, arises as a consequence of {\em i)} the neglect of market impact implicit in price taking behavior and of {\em ii)} excessive reactivity of agents. These issues are dealt with in detail in the simple case without public information. We also derive, for the general case, the critical learning rate above which trading behavior leads to turbulent dynamics of the market.Comment: 14 pages, 4 figures, minor change

Minority Game of price promotions in fast moving consumer goods markets

A variation of the Minority Game has been applied to study the timing of promotional actions at retailers in the fast moving consumer goods market. The underlying hypotheses for this work are that price promotions are more effective when fewer than average competitors do a promotion, and that a promotion strategy can be based on past sales data. The first assumption has been checked by analysing 1467 promotional actions for three products on the Dutch market (ketchup, mayonnaise and curry sauce) over a 120-week period, both on an aggregated level and on retailer chain level. The second assumption was tested by analysing past sales data with the Minority Game. This revealed that high or low competitor promotional pressure for actual ketchup, mayonnaise, curry sauce and barbecue sauce markets is to some extent predictable up to a forecast of some 10 weeks. Whereas a random guess would be right 50% of the time, a single-agent game can predict the market with a success rate of 56% for a 6 to 9 week forecast. This number is the same for all four mentioned fast moving consumer markets. For a multi-agent game a larger variability in the success rate is obtained, but predictability can be as high as 65%. Contrary to expectation, the actual market does the opposite of what game theory would predict. This points at a systematic oscillation in the market. Even though this result is not fully understood, merely observing that this trend is present in the data could lead to exploitable trading benefits. As a check, random history strings were generated from which the statistical variation in the game prediction was studied. This shows that the odds are 1:1,000,000 that the observed pattern in the market is based on coincidence.Comment: 19 pages, 10 figures, accepted for publication in Physica

Irrelevance of memory in the minority game

By means of extensive numerical simulations we show that all the distinctive features of the minority game introduced by Challet and Zhang (1997), are completely independent from the memory of the agents. The only crucial requirement is that all the individuals must posses the same information, irrespective of the fact that this information is true or false.Comment: 4 RevTeX pages, 4 figure

Thermal treatment of the minority game

We study a cost function for the aggregate behavior of all the agents involved in the Minority Game (MG) or the Bar Attendance Model (BAM). The cost function allows to define a deterministic, synchronous dynamics that yields results that have the main relevant features than those of the probabilistic, sequential dynamics used for the MG or the BAM. We define a temperature through a Langevin approach in terms of the fluctuations of the average attendance. We prove that the cost function is an extensive quantity that can play the role of an internal energy of the many agent system while the temperature so defined is an intensive parameter. We compare the results of the thermal perturbation to the deterministic dynamics and prove that they agree with those obtained with the MG or BAM in the limit of very low temperature.Comment: 9 pages in PRE format, 6 figure

Multi-market minority game: breaking the symmetry of choice

Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of utility then market occupancies become inhomogeneous with preference given to this market where the fluctuation occured first. There exists a critical size of agent population above which agents on bigger market behave collectively. In this regime there always exists a history of decisions for which all agents on a bigger market react identically.Comment: 15 pages, 12 figures, Accepted to 'Advances in Complex Systems

Generating Functional Analysis of the Dynamics of the Batch Minority Game with Random External Information

We study the dynamics of the batch minority game, with random external information, using generating functional techniques a la De Dominicis. The relevant control parameter in this model is the ratio $\alpha=p/N$ of the number $p$ of possible values for the external information over the number $N$ of trading agents. In the limit $N\to\infty$ we calculate the location $\alpha_c$ of the phase transition (signaling the onset of anomalous response), and solve the statics for $\alpha>\alpha_c$ exactly. The temporal correlations in global market fluctuations turn out not to decay to zero for infinitely widely separated times. For $\alpha<\alpha_c$ the stationary state is shown to be non-unique. For $\alpha\to 0$ we analyse our equations in leading order in $\alpha$, and find asymptotic solutions with diverging volatility \sigma=\order(\alpha^{-{1/2}}) (as regularly observed in simulations), but also asymptotic solutions with vanishing volatility \sigma=\order(\alpha^{{1/2}}). The former, however, are shown to emerge only if the agents' initial strategy valuations are below a specific critical value.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures, uses Revtex. Replaced an old version of volatility graph that. Rephrased and updated some reference